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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Plaintiff-Appellant (herein "Plaintiff") disputes the
Defendant-Appellees1 (herein "Defendants") mischaracterizations
concerning the appropriate standard of review contained through
their

Brief.

First,

state

courts

entertain Section 1983 Actions.

have

jurisdiction

to

Martinez v. California, 444

U.S. 277, 283-284, n.8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, n.8 (1980) and
Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980).

Second,

a dismissal under Rule 12(b) U.R.C.P. is a severe measure and
only should be granted unless it is clear that a party is not
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved
in support of the party's claim.
Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).

Coleman v. Utah State Land
Third, under Section 1983, a

plaintiff is required to make only two allegations in order to
state a cause of action under the statute:

(1) that some

person deprived him of a federal right, and

(2) that such

person acted under color of state or territorial law.
Toledo, 466 U.S. 635

(1980).

Gomez v.

Fourth, complaints asserting

Section 1983 claims are to be liberally construed.

Morrison v.

Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. den. 100 S.Ct. 1648
(1980).

Fifth, no specific reference to Section

required to state a claim under Section 1983.
448 U.S. 122, 128-29 n. 11 (1980).

-1-

1983 is

Maher v. Gagne,

Point One
THE DEFENDANT UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES ARE PERSONS UNDER
SECTION 1983 AND MAY BE SUED FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF, ANCILLARY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COURT COSTS
The Defendant has attempted to throw confusion into the
analysis of this issue.

While it is true that the State and

its agencies are not persons under Section 1983 for damage
actions, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
105 L.Ed.45, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), Will makes it clear that a
state, its agencies and officers in official capacities, are
persons under Section 1983 for prospective injunctive relief.
Will, supra, 105 L.Ed, at 58, n. 10.

The reason for this is

because such actions are not treated as actions against the
state.

This includes ancillary attorneys fees and court costs.

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).

Further, contrary to the

Defendants1 assertion, a Section 1983 action for damages may
lie against state officials in their individual capacities.
Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).

Hafer is significant

because Hafer clarified its decision in Will.

The Supreme

Court in Hafer held, supra at 360:
"In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
(citation omitted) we held that state officials
'acting in their official capacities1 are outside
the class of 'persons1 subject to liability under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Petitioner takes this
language to mean that Section 1983 does not
authorize suits against state officers for damages
arising from official acts. We reject this reading
of Will and hold that state officials sued in their
individual capacities are 'persons1 for purposes of
Section 1983."
-2-

In the present action, the Plaintiff filed an initial
Complaint, Record, Page 2, an Amended Complaint, Record, Page
179, and a Second Amended Complaint.
Brief.

Exhibit A to Appellant's

Each of these complaints allege that the Plaintiff was

denied his federal rights by the Defendants under state law.
In addition, the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint sets
forth the parties with particularity and the manner in which
they are sued.

Paragraph 3 alleges that the Defendant State

Board of Education is sued for prospective injunctive relief,
attorneys fees and court costs.

Will, supra.

Paragraphs 4

through 7 allege that the named individual Defendants are sued
both in their individual capacities for the damages alleged,
and in their official capacities for the injunctive prospective
relief alleged.
Complaint

Hafer, supra.

seeks

an

teaching certificate.
punitive damages.

forth

injunction

restoring

the

Plaintiff's

It also seeks special, compensatory, and

Lastly, it seeks ancillary attorneys fees

and costs of court.
sets

The Plaintiff's Second Amended

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Complaint

appropriate

causes

of action

and

the District

Court's dismissal under Rule 12(b) was plain error.
Point Two
THE PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO SUE FOR INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF BECAUSE A CASE OR CONTROVERSY STILL EXISTS
After this Court remanded the case following its decision
in Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 800 P.2d 811 (1990),

-3-

the Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment to immediately
restore his certificate to teach.
the Plaintiff's motion.

The District Court granted

As a consequence the Plaintiff's

certificate was restored but without any further relief.
Court

granted

The

the Plaintiff the right to file an amended

complaint before determining what relief would be appropriate.
Thereafter, the District Court dismissed the entire action
based upon the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On appeal the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims
for injunctive relief to restore the Plaintiff's certificate
are

moot

properly
Court's

because

the

Defendant

restored

his

certificate

award

Defendant

did

of

partial

restore

summary

the

State

Board

following
judgment.

Plaintiff's

of

Education

the

District

Although

the

certificate,

the

Defendant did not fully comply with the District Court's Order
and provide the Plaintiff with any proof that it complied with
Paragraph 3 of the Order and notified every school district, in
Utah and elsewhere, that the Plaintiff's certificate had been
restored.

The Defendant ignores this fact in its Brief to the

Court.

The fact remains that the Plaintiff has not been

accepted

for

employment

in

the

school

system

elsewhere since his certificate was restored.

in Utah

or

The Plaintiff

contends that the Defendants have not fully complied with the
Court's order and, in addition, the Plaintiff claims that the

-4-

Defendants' dissemination of expunged information affected his
liberty interests under Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
572-73,

92 S.Ct.

2701, 2706-07

(1972).

These claims are

ongoing in nature. Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582,
585-586 (10th Cir. 1990).

Not only is prospective injunctive

relief proper as to all defendants, Will, supra, but also is
the Plaintiff's damage action as to the individual defendants,
Hafer, supra.
Moreover, the Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees as
a prevailing party.

Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App.

1990) and Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).

The District

Court specifically refused to address this issue despite the
Plaintiff's

argument

to do so.

See Plaintiff's Reply to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Point Three, p. 11.
the

District

prejudice

in

Court
its

dismissed
entirety.

the

Plaintiff's

Contrary

to

the

Instead,

action

with

Defendants'

assertion, attorney's fees is not a collateral matter which may
be filed as an action independently of the main merits action.
Indeed, the Defendant never made this argument to the District
Court.

The Defendant insisted that the Plaintiff's claims for

attorney's

fees

be

dismissed

along

with

the

Plaintiff's

Complaint.

The Plaintiff is not aware of any authority which

suggests that a prevailing party must file a separate action
under Section 1988 in order to recover his fees.

-R-

Attorney's

fees are, in fact, determined upon the extent a prevailing
party is successful in his merits action.
461 U.S. 424 (1983).
costs

are

core

Hensly v. Eckerhart,

Accordingly, attorney's fees and court

elements

in

injunctive prospective relief.

civil

rights

actions

seeking

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678

(1978), reh denied, 439 U.S. 1112 (1979).

In the present

action, the District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's request
for

attorney's

complaint.

fees in dismissing

the

Plaintiff's

amended

It was plain error for the District Court to

dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint under Rule 12(b) seeking such
fees.
The Defendants intimate that their actions merely violated
the expungement code and, since they returned the certificate,
no Section 1983 action may lie.

Such is not the case.

In

Maine v. Thiboutot, supra, the Supreme Court held that this
Court has authority to hear Section 1983 claims brought in
state

court

within

an

administrative

context

administrative procedures violated federal law.

where

the

The facts in

Maine show that the Plaintiffs there sought initial judicial
review of Maine's Human Services agency which denied them
benefits after they prevailed.

The Plaintiffs subsequently

amended their complaint to specifically assert Section 1983
violations to recover their attorney's fees.
upheld their award of attorney's fees.

-6-

The Supreme Court

Point Three
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE LAW OF THE CASE
The Defendant specifically argued at the District Court
level that the Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Utah
Governmental

Immunity Act and the law of the case.

See

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 (Record
p. 405 and 406). The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's
Complaint based in part upon these specific arguments.
Order dated November 25, 1992, page 2.

See

(Record, p. 490-492).

Now, on appeal, the Defendants have retreated from these
positions.

The Defendants' Brief, page 13, states for the

first time in this case that, "Defendants do not claim that the
Utah

Governmental

Immunity Act applies to the plaintiff's

federal civil rights claims."

Indeed, as Plaintiff argued

before the District Court, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act
cannot bar his

federal civil rights claims.

Martinez v.

California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) and Felder v. Casey, 108 S.Ct.
2303 (1988).

"Accordingly, we have held that a state law that

immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under
Section 1983 is preempted even where the federal civil rights
litigation takes place in state court...."

Id. at 2307.

Also

see Maddock v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987)
wherein this Court implicity overruled the same argument.

-7-

The Defendants have apparently retreated from their "law
of the case" argument in this regard as well.

The Defendants'

Brief makes no mention of this argument at all.
Instead, in an apparent attempt to mislead this Court, the
Defendants assert that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act should
apply

to

Plaintiff's

irrelevant.
civil

rights

state law claims.

This argument is

The Plaintiff's Complaint clearly asserts federal
claims

under

Section

1983.

Any

confusion

concerning this fact must be resolved against the Defendants
under the liberal pleading rules set forth in Gomez v. Toledo
and Morrison v. Jones, supra.

If the Defendants are attempting

to assert the statutory immunity found in the Act against the
Plaintiff's claims founded directly under Utah's Constitution,
the

Defendants'

arguments

also

must

fail

because

Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act cannot have precedence over Utah's
Constitution.

Coleman v. Utah St. Land Board, 795 P.2d 622,

631 (Utah 1990) and Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413
S.E.2d 276 (1992).

As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated

in Corum, which is a case surprisingly similar to the instant
one,
"However, in determining the rights of citizens
under
the
Declaration
of
Rights
of
our
Constitution,
it
is
the
judiciary's
responsibility to guard and protect those rights.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot stand
as a barrier to North Carolina's citizens who
seek to remedy violations of their rights
guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.
It
would indeed be a fanciful gesture to say on the

-8-

one hand that citizens have constitutional
individual civil rights that are protected from
encroachment actions by the State, while on the
other
hand
saying
that individuals whose
constitutional rights have been violated by the
State cannot sue because of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity." Id at 291•
Clearly, under the Defendants1 argument the "sovereign immunity
tail" would be wagging the "constitutional dog."
Point Four
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING DIRECTLY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
In Point

IV of the Defendants' Brief, the Defendants

challenge whether the Plaintiff may allege a direct violation
of

the

Federal

Constitution

because

the

named

individual

Defendants are state officials and not federal officials.
Plaintiff

submits

position.
have

the

Defendants

are

suits

against

state

officials

violations of the Federal Constitution.
against

capacity.

in

their

Since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Courts

permitted

actions

incorrect

The

the

Franklin

officials
v.

when

Gwinnett

for

direct

This includes damage

sued

County

in an
Public

individual
Schools, &

Prescott, 112 S.Ct. 1028 (1992), Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 237-238 (1974).

Also see Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012,

cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 2562 (1990)

(11th Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 110 S.Ct. 2562, 109 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990) and other cases
cited in Plaintiff's Appellant Brief, p. 47-49.

-9-

Noteably, the Defendants do not contest on appeal the
Plaintiff's right to sue directly under Utah's Constitution.
Paragraphs 19, 37, 44, and 48 of the Plaintiff's complaint
allege direct violations of Utah's Constitution.

For example,

Article I, Section 7 provides, "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
court

has

held

that

decisions

relating

to the

This

Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution are "highly
persuasive" when interpreting the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution.

Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Ind.

Com'n., 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982).

In Davis v. Passman,

422 U.S. 228 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a cause of
action and damage remedy may be implied directly under the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.

If Davis is highly

persuasive, this court should also imply a direct cause of
action under Article I, Section 7, of Utah's Constitution.
Despite
attitude

on

either

the

Defendants'

ignorance

this point, state appellate

or

courts

cavalier

vigorously

defend its citizens from unwarranted governmental abridgement
of rights guaranteed by their own constitutions.

Again, a most

instructive case is Corum v. University of North Carolina,
supra,

where

directly

the

enforced

Carolina
its

Supreme

freedom

provisions.

-10-

of

Court
speech

specifically
and

due

and

process

Point Five
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFfS CLAIMS
ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
i.
Applicable Statute of Limitations
The Defendant ignores the decision of Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985).

This seminole decision held that states

must apply the limitations period which are applicable to
personal injury cases.

The rationale was due to the federal

interests in "uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of
unnecessary litigation".
these

federal

Id. at 275.

interests

could

The court held that

best

be

achieved

by

"characterizing" Section 1983 claims as personal injury claims.
"The characterization of all Section 1983 actions as involving
claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice
of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the
federal interests vindicated by Section 1983".

Id. at 279.

This

laws

characterization

prevents

state

from

"discriminat[ing] against federal claims, or be inconsistent
with federal law in any respect."
Utah's

legislature, in attempting

to truncate

federal

interests, enacted Section 78-12-28(3) U.C.A. (1953) to provide
a two year statute of limitation, and was in direct response to
the Tenth Circuit's decision of Mismash v. Murray City, 730
F.2d

1366

(10th Cir. 1984).

-li-

Clearly this is an abuse of

legislative

function.

This legislative action is squarely

contemptuous of Wilson and cannot be condoned.

As stated in

Federal v. Casey, supra, at 2306, which struck down Wisconsin's
notice-of-claim statute, a "federal right cannot be defeated by
the forms of local practice."
In Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, at 1339,
footnote 1, this Court recognized the conflict between Wilson
and Section 78-12-28(3).

However, it left the validity of the

statute for another day.

The Plaintiff respectfully submits

that the day has come to strike down the statute as unduly
restrictive of federal civil rights.
ii.
Relation Back
The Defendants dispute that the concept of relation back
is applicable in this case.

In response, the Plaintiff submits

that he did make a timely request to amend his complaint which
was denied by the trial court.

Further, assuming that Utah's

two year statute is applicable from the Plaintiff's second
request to amend his complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the
principle of relation back is indeed applicable to the facts of
this case.

This is contrary to the Defendant's assertion that the
Plaintiff did not attempt to characterize his action as a
Section 1983 action until after the remand in Ambus v. state
Board of Education, supra.

-12-

The Plaintiff filed his original complaint and request for
a preliminary injunction in a hurried fashion due to the fact
the Defendants1 actions removed the Plaintiff from his job and
classroom.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the

Plaintiff's original complaint based on Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act.
pointed

out

Defendant's

(Record 148-149).
Felder

motion

v.
in

Casey,
its

In response, the Plaintiff
supra,

entirety.

which
In

rebutted

the

the

Plaintiff's

response, the Plaintiff specifically requested the right to
amend to be more specific with his Section 1983 allegations.
(Record 162-164).

This request to amend was clearly within the

limitations period.

The District Court thereafter refused to

permit an amendment to assert Section 1983 damages due to the
belief that Felder v. Casey was not applicable but permitted an
amendment
review.

for

purposes

of

claims

involving

(See Exhibit A, at Record p. 178).

following
appeal,

only

this
the

Court's

Plaintiff

remand
filed

following
his

Second

the

judicial

Subsequently,
interlocutory

Amended

Complaint

insisting on the Section 1983 damages which resulted in the
dismissal which is before this Court.

Based upon these facts,

the Plaintiff did in fact make a timely application to amend
his complaint which was erroneously denied by the trial court.
Additionally,

even

if

this

Court

disregards

the

Plaintiff's initial request to amend, the Plaintiff's Second
Amended

Complaint should be viewed under the relation back
-13-

principle as set forth in Plaintiff's Appellant Brief.

The

Defendants were well aware that a civil rights action was
pending due to their own motions to dismiss.
court's

intransigence

the

Plaintiff

was

Due to the trial
not

permitted

specifically name each of the additional parties.

to

Changing the

capacity in which the Defendants are sued did not change any of
the material allegations of the complaint or add new causes of
action.

As stated in Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York,,

761 P. 2d 581, 586

(Utah App. 1988) and Doxy-Lay ton Co. v.

Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976), an exception exists to
the rule against adding new parties where the new and old
parties have an identity of interest.

The State Board of

Education and the named individuals clearly have such identity
of

interest.

The

Attorney

General

has

represented

all

Defendants in this action from the initial hearings in this
case before the Defendant Board to the present time.
Defendant

Utah

State

Board

of

Education

and

all

The
other

Defendants were clearly put on notice of these claims as argued
in Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, at p. 20-27.
Point Six
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Defendants do not make any serious attempt to justify
their

actions

under

the

ministerial

distinction

to

the

qualified immunity defense as argued in Appellant's Brief, p.

-14-

35-41 •
argue

Ignoring this distinction, the Defendants primarily
that

they are entitled to the defense of qualified

immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
The ministerial distinction, however, is critical to an
examination of the Plaintiff's claims. Only if the ministerial
distinction fails must the court examine the test in Harlow.
The

ministerial

distinction

between discretionary

is

based

upon

the

difference

acts, such as the decision to bring

charges to suspend or revoke the Plaintiff's certificate, and
the

ministerial

decision.
immunity

acts

which

implement

such

discretionary

Ministerial acts are not clothed with qualified
if

such

acts

constitutional rights.

violates

the

Plaintiff's

civil

See Appellant's Brief, p. 40-41.

or

Also

see Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n. 14 (1984) where the
Supreme

Court

emphasized

this

distinction

and

Breault

v.

Chairman of Bd. of Fire Com'rs, 513 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1987),
cert, denied subnom. Forastiere v. Breault, 108 S.Ct. 1078
(1988).
P.2d

Also cf. Utah State Univ., Etc. v. Stro & Co., 646

715, 712

(Utah 1982) where this court recognized the

distinction of discretionary-ministerial duties involving the
qualified immunity defense in an action to recover investments
improperly

placed.

In this case, the Plaintiff does not

challenge the Defendant's decision to bring charges to suspend
or revoke his certificate.

Rather he challenges the method and

manner of implementing such decision.

-1 5-

He challenges whether

the Defendants can take his certificate, resulting in loss of
employment and reputation, by taking his certificate without
any

pretermination

hearing, by

conducting

hearings

without

compliance with the appropriate statutory notice, by taking his
certificate without any findings of fact, by using evidence at
the

hearings

which

violated

Utah's

expungement

code, and

ultimately by relying upon a newspaper article in justifying
its conduct.

These are all well pleaded allegations contained

in the Plaintiff's Complaint which should survive a motion to
dismiss.
With respect to the Defendant's direct claim of qualified
immunity,

the

discretionary

Plaintiff
in

points

character

are

out that
not

even

entitled

acts deemed
to

qualified

immunity if such acts violate "clearly established" rights,
Harlow,

supra.

The

quarrel

seems

to

lie

in

what

the

Plaintiff's clearly established rights were at the time they
were violated.

The Defendants contest only two items in their

brief.

First, they assert the notice provisions of Section
2
53A-7-111 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, were satisfied by merely

Section 53A-7-lll(l) provides that the Educational
Professional Practices Commission, an arm of the Defendant
Board, may not adversely affect a person's certificate "without
giving the individual an opportunity for a fair hearing."
Subsection (2) provides, "If an individual fails to request a
hearing within 30 days after written notice is sent to the last
known address and to the address shown on the records of the
commission, the commission may take action against the
certificate holder under this section." (Emphasis added).
-16-

sending notice to the Plaintifffs last known address.

The

Defendants

claim

but

returned.

However, the Defendants do not discuss Plaintiff's

that

a

notice

was

mailed

certified

contentions that the face of the documents do not show any
official postmark, postage, certified fee, or date stamp.
Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

See

Moreover, even assuming the notice

was merely mailed to the Plaintiff's last known address, such
act violates Section 53A-7-111 which also requires mailing to
the Plaintiff's permanent mailing address which was not done in
this case.

Notwithstanding the fact that the alleged mailing

was returned, no other action was taken to provide actual
notice to the Plaintiff despite the fact the Defendants knew
the Plaintiff had filed suit in federal court, was represented
by specific counsel, and was teaching in the Salt Lake School
District which is generally supervised and controlled by the
Defendant Board.

Section 53A-7-111 is a mandatory act where no

discretion is permitted.

Moreover, it was clearly established

that notice, in order to comport with due. process, be

Contrary to the Defendants' contentions, the records show
the Plaintiff's permanent address as different from the address
to where the notice was allegedly mailed. It is significant to
note that someone other than the Plaintiff, and presumably a
Defendant, crossed off the Plaintiff's permanent address in
these records in an apparent attempt to show that the two
addresses were the same.
See Exhibit B attached.
The
Plaintiff's permanent address has never changed and remains the
El Serrito address to this date.

-17-

"reasonably calculated under all the circumstances" to give
interested parties an opportunity to protect their interests.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313-314 (1950).

Ignoring a party's actual permanent address

contained in their own records, ignoring a party's counsel, and
ignoring the Plaintiff's actual place of work which was under
the Defendants' control, and blindly relying upon mailing

to a

questionable last known address, violated the Mullane standard.
With

respect

to

the

expungement

matter,

contrary

to

Defendants' desires, Utah's Expungement Act has been around for
a

long

time.

Expungement

The

Act,

Defendants

Section

cannot

77-18-2(5)(a)

amended, was clearly established.

deny
U.C.A.

that

Utah's

(1953),

as

Within the context of the

specific facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit recently ruled
that

Granite

Board

of

Education's

violation

of

Utah's

Expungement Act violated Plaintiff's Section 1983 rights to due
process of law.
No.

Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, Appellate

91-4015, issued

9/24/92, rehearing granted

Eleventh Amendment Immunity issue only.
hearing in this case

11/12/92 on

In advance of the

before the Defendant Board, and at the

In advance of the "reconsideration hearings" Plaintiff's
counsel made the Defendants aware of their constitutional
violations surrounding their actions, Defendants refused to
return the Plaintiff's certificate, and instead sent notice to
all fifty states and Utah School Districts of the revocation.
(Plaintiff's Initial Brief, Exhibit G ) .
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time of the hearing, the Plaintiff specifically informed the
Board of the expungement law and the fact the plain language of
the act prohibited what they intended to do and ultimately did.
Instead, the Defendants attempted to carve out an "exception"
to this plain language and failed.

This Court in Ambus v.

State Board of Education, 800 P.2d 811 (1990) did not invent
any protection for the Plaintiff but instead merely enforced
the plain language of the expungement statute.

In addition,

this court had already held against the position advanced by
the Defendants as early as 1980 in Matter of Noren, 621 P.2d
1247 (1980).

Doe v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 782 P.2d

489 (1989) had also been decided adversely to the Defendants1
position by the district court and the Attorney General was
involved

in

that

case

as well.

Lastly,

it was clearly

established under Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) that one element of privacy, protected by
the constitution, is the unwelcomed disclosure of personal
matters protected by statute.

As stated in Mangels v. Pena,

789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986), citing Nixon, "Information
is constitutionally protected when a legitimate expectation
exists that it will remain confidential while in the state's
possession."
The Defendants1 lame excuse that it didn't know the law is
unacceptable.

The rights which were violated were clearly

-1 Q -

established and were rights which a reasonable person should
have known•

The trial court's finding of qualified immunity

was in error and should be reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff's certificate to teach was revoked by the
Defendants based upon a newspaper account without any notice to
the Plaintiff, without any pretermination hearing, and with
sealed

and

expunged

post-termination

records

hearing,

without

Plaintiff's certificate, and
conclusions of law.

during

a
first

"reconsideration"
restoring

the

with no findings of fact or

Such action resulted in his dismissal as a

teacher from the Salt Lake School District.

Ultimately the

District Court ordered the return of his certificate.

However,

the Plaintiff suffered real and substantial damages in the form
of attorney's fees and loss of income.

The core inquiry is

whether the state Board and its officials may be shielded from
any responsibility for their unconstitutional conduct.

The

critical question is whether the Defendants are protected from
federal Section 1983 liability in some fashion under state law.
The Plaintiff suggests not.

The Plaintiff in this case spent

six years achieving a college education and a certificate to
practice what our society deems a professional calling.

Not

only was this abruptly taken from the Plaintiff in violation of
the law, it resulted in the loss of significant employment
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income, future pay, and substantial attorney's fees.

Not only

was the Plaintiff banned from teaching in Utah schools but,
through the Defendants notification procedures to other states,
he was banned from seeking employment anywhere in the United
States.

Even though his certificate was returned, no school

district in Utah has since hired the Plaintiff due to the
widespread dissemination of the events which were supposed to
be sealed and expunged.

Accordingly the Plaintiff's liberty

interests, or his name and reputation, has been adversely
affected.
The

founders

of

our

State

and

Federal

Constitutions

envisioned a system of government that would be accountable for
its irresponsible actions. The Defendants are required by law,
Section 53A-13-101(4) U.C.A.

(1988), to establish statewide

curriculum requirements which teach "obedience to law, respect
for and the understanding of the Constitutions of the United
States and for the State of Utah."

The Plaintiff respectfully

submits

erred

that

the

District

Court

in

complaint for damages and attorney's fees.

dismissing

his

The Defendants'

actions in this case were clearly unlawful.

The Plaintiff

respectfully requests that this Court reinstate the Plaintiff's
case, hold that the Plaintiff has stated proper claims, and
remand with instructions to proceed with the evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The

Plaintiff

respectfully
-21-

requests

that

this

Court

reverse

the

District

Complaint in full.

Court

and

reinstate

the

Plaintiff's

The Plaintiff respectfully requests that

this Court remand with instructions to the District Court to:
1.

Determine whether the Defendant Utah State Board of

Education complied with the Order of the District Court to
notify all jurisdictions of the reinstatement of Plaintiff's
certificate.
2.

Award attorney's fees against the Defendant Utah

State Board of Education and its officials in their official
capacities as ancillary to the equitable relief already granted
in restoring the Plaintiff's certificate and ancillary to the
proof of compliance with the District Court's Order.
3.
his

Consider the Plaintiff's claims for damages due to

employment, and

against

the

special, general

individual

defendants

and punitive
in

their

damages

individual

capacities.
4.

Consider what additional attorney's fees may be due

should the Plaintiff prevail on his theories of damages against
the

individual

DATED this

defendants

in

their

individual

capacities.

/ °f day of November, 1992.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
: ss.
)

STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says:
Stephen W. Cook, of the law firm COOK & DAVIS, attorney
for
Plaintiff/Appellant
herein;
served
the
attached
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF upon:
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the /fl5Uctay of November, 1992.
STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
November, 1992.
»$£?E,£iL'KWTSC.\
^

4*^

Sta*~ ---•* *ww'-

My" * roTrmftShsioH-Sxpires:
TTommishsi©]

Residing a t Salt Lake County
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EXHIBIT A

PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES BARRED
BY UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

v* w us i \ z i n i - . U i v ? | 2 11W I

County of Sait Lake - State of Utan
FILE NO.
TITLE:

['

PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

8 9 0 9 0 1 7 5 7 AA

(• COUNSEL PRESENT)

Stephen W. Cook

GREGORY AMBUS
•vs-

John S. McAllister

UTAH STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION

CLERK

HON. James s , Sawaya
JUDGE

REPORTER

DATE:

May 1 6 ,

1989

Thp. mat.t.p.r of defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on regularly for
hiring on fhp 1 5f-h day of May, 1989 with appearances as above stated.
Thft n? ^tPr was f^lly presented, arquea and submitted, and decision oj_
thp rnnrf- f-^kpn n^Q.r advisement.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings

^nd t-hp Rnhmi ssions of the parties and having considered the arguement of
-rnnngpl r now makftg jf-.g ruling a:; follows:

_

Plaintiff's claim for damages is barred by the Utah Governmental
Immunity

Act

as applied to the

uncontroverted

claim of the Plaintiff for damages.
et« sea.

facts of this case

and

the

See Utah Code Annotated, Sec, 63-30-1

The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claim for damages is granted.

Plaintiff's Petition for judicial review of the order of the administrative
board is not dismissed, however that claim is vague, and Plaintiff is
..granted t-P.n days from date of this Minute Entry r.uleing to

file an#

.amended Petition setting forthg# his saii claim and the relief sought.

lis
C o o i e s t o c o u n s e l /WN * . C r> J v /vY\ n ,.

\r

i(\0*0

-

EXHIBIT B

PERMANENT ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF

Rec. by Westminster 8-13-81
Record of Teaching Experience

SB 0340

Applicant May Write in This Space
(List Chronologically—Do Not Include Substitute or Student Teaching)
Major Assignment 1 Minor Assignment
School District
(Grade or Subject) (Grade or Subject) 1

School

l A ^ ^ r ^ ^ A ^ . j & S 1Jkj^^JlJJUVLKl\fJ

ZT/TV^

<\sr?JLAJIA-,

ML
5335**/

2ojjrjr/>A

HLA/J^JJ

AjisJtffiJL-

Years
19 to 19

I

m—mmm—m—mm^mmam

* on

$3 rirU

t-

\J •*/
r3fc
ATE BOARD O F E D U C A T I O N , Division" o f Staff D
UTAH STATE
Development
250 East Fifth South, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Gregory Thomas Ambus

Xi etna* A&J.hJL

Full Nome
0>t€.ctru
I
Mailing address
-S&ji^L
Sex IA MoritalStatus SSnt/*.

Citizenship/AS
lr&c*.fe

•

m<

<s»

,C_

JL+

^)££

SO L f'j
mm0f

-

f

y

u*

& f A/1

DoteOtcl<| -SO, I9SI
Soc. Sec.
Wo.SM-W-Cftfi
Date of Birth /p - 2 - ST
i£VJ4£Place of Birth Qdo*„
CM, A
T c h g . M o j o r o / ^ / o ^ y Tchg.
lchg. Minor

~-—
Year granted
Have you ever had a certificate revoked or suspended ? A/d Where ?
Have you ever been
convicted of violating any law (except traffic violations)? fijO If yesy explain on separate sheet.
Applicant Should Not Write in This Space
Type# of
Renewal
Renewal
Renewal
Renewal
Renewal
Endorsement
Date
Cert ifficate
ic
Date
Date
Date
Date
Date

BP

Secondary

8-13-81

'

AUB i e m

COOK AND WILDE
S 1EP1 f EN W

COOK

A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION

ROBERT H WILDE
.ONAL1) E KUNZ
JOHN K RICE
_

6925 UNION PARK CENTER, SUITE 490
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047

TELEPHONE 801-255-6000
FAX 801-561-3829

R E I D C DAVIS
KELLY DE HILL

April 3, 1989

HAND DELIVERED
Honorable James S. Sawaya
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Gregory Ambus v. Granite Board of Education
Civil No* 890901757AA

Dear Judge Sawaya:
Following the hearing on Wednesday, March 29 f 1989, Mr.
Ambus obtained the enclosed record of address from Granite
School District* He obtained this document from Mary Lou
Stark, director of secondary personnel. Please note that Mr.
Ambus1 permanent and present address is listed as 3316 El.
Serrito Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. I am also informed Mary
Lou Stark would testify that she was not contacted by Roger
Mauritzen or his office concerning Mr. Ambus1 address.
If at all possible, I would like this added to the
record. If you would like the information in the form of an
Affidavit or other testimony, please do not hesitate to
contact to me.
Sincerely,

:ephen W.
SWC/ard
Enclosure
cc: John McAllister

(hand delivered)

sttfflSftto-

: 3 * 0 § AST 3 § 4 | S O U T H *
SALT L A K E X 1 T V . U T A H S 4 f 1 5
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

.esent A

w^.

3316 E l . S e r r i t o dr.
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah

City & Suite
Sex

Marital Status

Thomas

-Gregory

Jlrabus-

*Jame

D1 VOrCCQ

A g e

of

Tel

4&b^£53>

(

Date of A p p l i c a t i o n

3316 E l . S e r r i t o Dr.
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

Permanent Address
City & State

C h

,|dren

+-o*.?

? Date of B i r t h
MAIUfcN

2 year o l d daughter

Height

-Tel

487485:

. Weight .

Mor F

Name

Social Security No

of S p o u s e .

529-94-5946

COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES YOU HAVE ATTENDED
O A T E S O f ATTENOANCE FROM

INSTITUTION

Out. i o lie A p p l i e d F o r

E x p n a t i o n Date

Elemental y

"May 8, ia«l

•••

(other)

rftri'Tj" H'I»

—rrrrrrw-v^

r

_

2ND _
3RD_
4TH_
*TH

_

H _

j

iiiiiiiN

Biaiagy

'"

• •l[

Major(i)

Science
Counseling
Foreign Language.

Soc Studies .
Minor(s) .
Spec

Ed

(Specify)
Lang Arts
Math

(Specify)

Physical Science

7-1? Science in J r . High up to advanr
.Biology i n High School Biology-Tennis Coach

Could Teach
(other).

S u b j e c t P»r t i n n e t

-

^

Media

Music ( I n s t r u m e n t ) .
Piano
Phys

_

-

*•••*•

Music (Vocal)

Team Teaching.

B.S. Biology May 1980

G r a n i t e S c h o o l D i s t r i c t o f f e r s a self i n s u r e d h e a l t h a n d m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e \C
its e m p l o y e e s a n d t h e i r spouses a n d d e p e n d e n t c h i l d r e n A f t e r e m p l o y m e n t a n o
e m p l o y e e w i l l bt a s k e d t o f i l l o u t a d e t a i l e d h e a l t h h i s t o r y r e p o r t o n h i r n s e l f / h e r s e l
a n d h i s / h e r f a m i l y w h i c h m a y r e s u l t i n an i n s u r a n c e w a i v e t ( s ) t o r a p r e - e x i s t m
c o n d i n o n ( s ) F u r t h e r e a c h n e w e m p l o y e e w i l l be a s k e d t o f u r n i s h the D i s t u c t w i t
a personal health e x j m m a t i o n report by a medical doctor

,7Vn

-nrr^^rw^^

KIND.
tST

HOUHSOI- CRLDI
OuARItR
SEMfcST

t+j+totDMtrtBM***^

-UTAH CEMTtP tCATIOM

Secondar y

DEGRfcE 8. DATE R E C E I V E D

1979

1973

Westminster Cdllege Salt Lake City

I ype

TO

Ed

(other)
Reading

Prefer

J u n i o r High

Senior High

Tenn'rf'tb^^-'Te'ffftTS'^fh^Ta'Pgh f j5utt&Sffirfti •fte'r
Currently ranged 5th i n btate MeTf-s-ft-smgit

Special I n t w r e s t w i n

HUM WHICH P L A C E M E N T B U R E A U M A Y WE O B T A I N YOUR C R E D E N T I A L S OR CONF I D E N T I A L F I L E

Westminster Colleqe Placement

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

•->•

xpenenced teachers list any teaching references not m your confidential file

Position

Name

State

City

Street Address

Position

Name

State

City

Street Address

Position

Name
Street Address

City

State

rROFEWIONAL £K»ER»ENCE

j

School

Jordan Ii itermediate llthW 4thS
Fast. High School 13E 8thS

j
|
1
1

From
Mo.
Yr

Address

1 '

Total
Yr Years Grade or Subjects Taught

Principal

Sept 7p Dec 7|8 h^lt-year 8tn bciance Mr. A11 e n —
Septl9B0 Dec 198(0 halt-year Adv. \V lacementt 1U-1Z.
Dr. Devries
Feb 19B1 May ids:. halt-year 7-8 J>cience Kocheavei
1 s
/v

[

Indian H l i s Middle 116S 13thE

r

To
Mo

-

t any school district or organization to which you are now under c o n t r a c t .
ve y o u ever been discharged f r o m employment? (explain)
ve you ever been convicted of a crime other than traffic violations? (explain)
t you a relative of any administrator of Granite School District? Yes

* *

HO
No

ereby certify that my statements on this application are true and correct.

. If yes, Name ,

R i l l PhristnmilniK -

U. S. Citizenship _ _ l £ S
Yes or No

K3.0U&UJ.

mature .
D a t e iJC_'S~&;0

ipioyment approved by

ary: /

' "

~~"

'/ %

*^Srfcnnl

A__

r
. Grade/Sub|.

. Replaces.

